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Chapter 3: Article 2 
How and Why Parties Respond to Membership Decline: The Case of 
the SPD and the CDU
Abstract
A dominant assumption in the existing literature on party organisation in Western 
Europe holds that parties acquiesce in membership decline because modern 
campaigning is capital- rather than labour-intensive. This article studies eight 
reform attempts, from 1989 to 2011, by two paradigmatic member- ship parties, the 
German SPD and CDU. The examined party documents show that the two parties 
still value and seek mass membership. Indeed, most of the proposed reforms are 
not attempts at organisational innovation, but have the intention of consolidating 
the existing membership organisations. Surprisingly, the parties are concerned 
about membership decline not mainly for electoral reasons, but because they value 
and wish to preserve their legacy as membership organisations. Secondly, both the 
SPD and the CDU documents suggest that the legal-normative imperative of the 
German Basic Law requiring parties to sustain democratic linkage necessitates a 
membership organisation. Furthermore, the SPD views mass membership as 
inherent to social democratic ideology.
Introduction 
Existing literature holds that modern political parties have little need for mass membership, 
which has fallen steeply across Western Europe in the last 40 – 50 years.
1
Professionalised 
campaigning paid by public subsidies has allegedly reduced the electoral value of rank-and-
file members.
2
Accordingly, ‘the large majority of parties seem relatively unconcerned about 
their memberships and are instead much more focused on reaching out to the wider public 
through professional campaigning and marketing techniques’.
3
Nevertheless, ‘the literature still lacks empirical validation of the theories’.
4
As a 
consequence, we are led to assume that parties acquiesce in membership loss, when the case 
could be that they are trying unsuccessfully to halt it. While steady decline in figures may 
suggest the former, only by studying the parties’ internal assessments of their membership 
organisations can we gauge how they envision themselves in the future, and which 
particular organisational form they favour, are seeking to achieve, and why. Therefore, this 
article makes the parties’ own assessment the main object of empirical study. In order to 
analyse how and why parties respond to membership decline, then, this article analyses 
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eight membership reform reports and proposals, issued from 1989 to 2011,
5
by the 
German SPD and CDU. This time period was chosen because both parties have seen 
substantial membership decline during those decades. The decision to focus on the two 
main German parties was made because the SPD is historically the paradigmatic case of 
a membership party in Western Europe, while the CDU is an equally influential and 
institutionalised, but historically less committed membership party from within the same 
political context. To structure the analysis, I introduce a theoretical framework with three 
available response options for parties to membership decline. In short, they may choose to 
do nothing about it (‘organisational inaction’), try to halt and/or reverse it (‘organisational 
consolidation’), or involve civil society in party affairs in new ways (‘organisational 
innovation’). Applying the analytical framework in a case study of the SPD and the 
CDU shows that these parties still seek mass membership by opting primarily for 
organisational consolidation, yet also introduce some innovative measures. Both reject the 
notion of relinquishing mass membership by stressing their organisational legacy as 
membership parties and a legal-normative imperative: in the post-war era, the two parties 
have honoured the democratic linkage mandate of the 1949 German Basic Law and the 
1967 Party Law through mass membership. At a general level, these arguments form a 
path-dependent rationale for membership: preserving a tradition of mass membership begun 
by organisational choices made at a distant point in time. In addition, the SPD views mass 
membership as inherent to social democratic ideology.
The paper is divided into four sections: the first part of the theory section reviews the 
existing demand-side literature on party membership, while the second gives a framework for 
analysing parties’ response to membership decline. The second section presents the 
methodology. In the third and empirical part, I analyse the reform reports/proposals. The 
final and concluding section discusses the findings and their implications. 
Party membership – a ‘vestigial’ organ?
6
Scholars have long since identified societal and technological processes allegedly making 
parties less interested in enrolling members. The nub of these arguments is the 
substitutability of members in modern campaigning. According to Kirchheimer, party 
leaders in post-class politics attempt to ‘catch all’ voters.
7
Television became the dominant 
arena of electoral competition, in what Wiesendahl characterises as a ‘Copernican turn’ in 
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campaigning.
8
Already in the 1950s, which is generally regarded as the ‘golden age’ of mass 
membership, McKenzie saw ample evidence in Britain of the new media rendering the 
traditional electioneering functions of members far less important.
9
So, in what according to 
Epstein is a US-led development,
10
medialisation and professionalisation of West European 
politics in the post-war period are said to have caused a general downgrading of the 
conventional membership organisation, giving rise to the capital-intensive catch-all 
party.
11
Subsequent case studies have identified these trends across the Western world.
12
Another key factor generally considered to have undermined the need for rank-and- file 
membership is the introduction of public subsidies. With a growing discrepancy between 
what members could chip in and party expenses, state subsidies were introduced in the 
1950s to sustain extra-parliamentary party activities. Latin American countries (Costa 
Rica 1954, Argentina 1955) pioneered the practice, while West Germany, in 1959, was 
first in Western Europe.
13
Public subventions have since been instituted worldwide.
14 
Furthermore, Ponce and Scarrow note that individual donors form a yet under-exploited 
source of funds for parties.
15
Due to these changes, the costs of mass membership are now 
said to outweigh its benefits. Members are recruited through non-material and material 
incentives, for example the opportunity to influence party policy.
16
But according to May 
and Katz, active members have more radical policy views than voters and the leadership, 
and may force their party to endorse vote-losing policies.
17
Furthermore, it is costly to 
sustain a membership organisation.
18
In sum, a rich tradition within membership research con- 
cludes that parties have lost interest in mass membership, as new electioneering 
resources gradually replace it. In the following, I put that claim to the test through the 
German case. For this purpose, I firstly develop an analytical framework.
  
Analytical framework
Facing membership decline, I conceptualise three possible response types available to parties: 
organisational inaction, organisational consolidation, and organisational innovation.
19
Organisational inaction
‘Organisational inaction’ is the option of not doing anything about the loss of members, either 
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by choice or failure to act. In case of the former, the party leadership concludes that electoral 
competitiveness is maintained in spite of a shrinking membership, in line with van Biezen et 
al.’s claim. Deliberate inaction is in line with Kirchheimer’s prediction that modern 
campaigning, media-centred and capital- rather than labour-intensive, leads to gradual 
abandonment of the grassroots organisation and decision-making according to the 
leadership’s discretion.
20
Studies show that medialisation and professionalisation have 
fundamentally changed campaigning.
21
Consequently, the local, activist-based organisation 
branch now plays a subordinate role in campaigning, Mancini and Swanson find in their 
study of 11 democratic and democratising regimes.
22
Especially the introduction of state 
subsidies has facilitated the transformation.
23
Regarding the latter case, Harmel and Janda 
and Goodin argue that political parties are basically cumbersome institutions that change 
their behaviour only if jolted by some external event.
24 
Applied to membership figures, 
this could mean that parties fail to address decline systematically, as party organisers are 
accustomed to reading annual reports showing only marginally fewer members from year 
to year, perhaps believing an improved dues collection procedure the next year will turn 
the tide.
Organisational consolidation
The outset of the second response alternative is the party leadership’s intent to halt and/or 
reverse the loss of members. ‘Organisational consolidation’ denotes commitment to the 
concept of the membership party and a corresponding strategy of repairing and/or 
strengthening the membership organisation, relying on conventional means such as 
recruitment campaigns and improving membership maintenance procedures. In practice, this 
is the strategy of a general secretary alarmed by discovering that his/her party’s 
membership has shrunk markedly for years, regards the development as unacceptable and 
decides to better both recruitment and maintenance.
Parties choose this response option because members can perform a number of 
valuable functions. Firstly, they provide voluntary manpower in campaigns, spreading the 
message in social media, handing out flyers and electoral programmes, knocking on doors, 
representing the party at stands.
25
Also, parties recruit members to internal and public 
offices.
26
In most parliamentary democracies, party representatives control the access to 
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elected office.
27
Moreover, parties perform this task more exclusively now than at any time 
in party history. Only in the USA and semi-presidential systems such as France and 
Finland are non-party ministers relatively frequent.
28 
Also, party appointments sometimes 
extend beyond the political to positions in the civil service or companies and corporations 
under political control. Thus, partisan patronage provides additional opportunities for the 
party faithful,
29
despite efforts to reduce it in some countries.
30
Thirdly, members provide 
valuable funds for parties. In a survey of party finance in Western Europe, Nassmacher 
shows that with the exception of Spain and France, members still provide a significant 
proportion of party income, especially so in Germany and the Netherlands.
31
In the case of 
Germany, Detterbeck estimates membership fees to make up 40 to 50 per cent of total 
party revenue for the CDU and the SPD.
32
Fourthly, members boost parties’ vote share. 
Studies find that members are likely to be their party’s most devout voters, voting more 
regularly and consistently than non-members,
33
and that party membership correlates 
clearly with electoral stability.
34 
Furthermore, members provide their parties with outreach 
benefits.
35 
By being ‘party ambassadors’ to their communities, members work as ‘vote 
multipliers’. Matching social characteristics could also be a precondition for gaining 
additional support from certain segments of the electorate the party seeks to attract, for 
example ethnic minorities or women.
36 
Finally, members create linkage between rulers and 
the ruled. Beer and Katz see rank-and-file membership as proof of a party’s roots in civil 
society.
37
Scarrow argues that a sizeable membership can convey a party’s broad popular 
support,
38
and in the debate on the implications of mass membership decline, she identifies 
parties’ ability to generate linkage as the most central concern.
39
In sum, organisational 
consolidation is the logical response choice for party leaders who see members as 
instrumental to electoral competitiveness in some or all of the ways above.
Organisational innovation
The third response option is to go new ways. ‘Organisational innovation’ is the introduction 
of new strategic policies to involve citizens in party work without enrolling them as 
members. It is an alternative for party organisers cognisant of the ongoing membership 
loss, who reason that the party needs to cooperate at some level with civil society in 
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policy-making and personnel recruitment, but does not need mass membership to do so. This 
response type is similar to organisational inaction in sharing the analysis that a large 
membership is no longer needed. However, it differs in the view that the party must replace 
members with alternative liaisons with the external environment.
Courting civil society, but turning away from membership as a means, could 
reflect  the  common  supposition  that  policy-oriented  members  are  a  liability  to vote-
maximising leaders.
40 
But as that hypothesis has not been convincingly corroborated by 
empirical studies,
41
party leaders are more likely responding to a presumed post-mass 
membership situation, reckoning citizens in general are not interested in enrolling in 
political parties.
42
Against the latter backdrop, some evolutionary party model theorists 
argue that we are witnessing the emergence of a new party type, which combines features 
of both the mass and cadre models. Developed from Koole’s ‘modern cadre party’,
43 
Heidar proposes the model of the ‘network party’:
44
a party based on a professional 
leadership which operates  within  the formal structure of a membership  party.  Members 
are still needed to uphold the organisational apparatus, but the member/voter ratio is 
smaller. A related yet the most novel attribute of the model is that policy development and 
leader recruitment increasingly take place in informal networks parallel to the membership 
organisation. In short, ‘organisational innovation’ means developing new arenas for 
interaction with civil society.
Response operationalisation
In the case of ‘organisational inaction’, no action is discernible on the part of the central 
party organisation. There should be plenty of empirical examples of this if van Biezen et 
al.’s statement cited in the introduction indeed is true. In such an apparent case, empirical 
inspection must identify no evident strategy by the central organisation to deal with the loss 
of members and subsequently uncover whether or not the inaction is deliberate or the result 
of negligence.
‘Organisational consolidation’ is operationalised as proposed recruitment measures or 
references to improving membership maintenance procedures/services, or the introduction of 
new material or non-material incentives to increase the attractiveness of membership. 
‘Organisational innovation’ is measured as the introduction of strategies to involve non-party 
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actors in party work. Clearly, the three response options are ideal types. The empirical world 
does not usually offer clear-cut manifestations of theoretical constructs, although the latter are 
inspired by empirical observations. The model is thus first and foremost a heuristic device 
that guides the empirical analysis, with one qualification. The model implicitly 
distinguishes between ‘organisational inaction’ and two modes of action – ‘organisational 
consolidation’ and ‘organisational innovation’. These two, however, are poles on an 
action scale. Depending upon (the researcher’s assessment of) the quality and the quantity 
of the measures, the active responses of the parties will be located in greater or lesser 
proximity to one of the two ideal types, shown in Figure 1:
Figure 1: Party response options
Method and case selection
The reform efforts analysed comprise three reports by each party and two individual 
proposals by a former SPD party manager and a former SPD general secretary, issued 
from 1989 to 2011.
45 
The reports from each party were all released as official statements of 
the central office. While the individual proposals do not represent the consensus position of 
the leadership, they reflect the take of the primary organisational manager on party 
membership. Through qualitative content analysis, I synthesise the proposed 
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countermeasures along with the rationales behind them.
The SPD and the CDU were chosen for three reasons. Firstly, a study of response to 
membership decline must obviously include parties with a grassroots membership 
organisation, of which the SPD and the CDU are paradigmatic historical cases. The SPD, 
incidentally Europe’s oldest social democratic party, is a typical representative of the mass-
based, branch structure organisation which Duverger ranked electorally the most 
competitive, and which inspired his prediction of a ‘contagion from the left’. The CDU 
was founded as a cadre party and a right-wing alternative to the SPD in 1945, but later 
adopted the branch structure, in line with Duverger’s prediction. In other words, both parties 
are historically typical membership parties, that is, parties that sought rank-and-file 
membership. As Scarrow makes explicit, this concept does not carry any implications about 
structure such as degree of centralisation or organisational apparatus.46 Consequently, the 
two German units are representative of the broader set of European (membership) parties 
losing members. Secondly, the interest of this article is general organisational 
developments within the party system, not within a single party or party family. I therefore 
include parties on each side of the political spectrum. With both a social democratic and a 
Christian democratic party genuinely committed to the membership model, the German case 
is appropriate for examining the response of parties to membership decline. Thirdly, the 
research puzzle requires that the case parties have experienced an enduring loss of 
members, which both the SPD and the CDU have. For these reasons, the German case is 
a natural selection for an in-depth inquiry, as in many of the classic works in the study 
of party organisation, for example Michels, Kirchheimer, Epstein, Panebianco, and 
Scarrow.
47
How do the SPD and the CDU respond to membership decline? 
The SPD and the CDU’s proposed responses fit into four categories. The three first are geared 
towards organisational consolidation, the last represents organisational innovation:
Organisational consolidation
Enhancing intra-party democracy. Both the SPD and the CDU have opted for more direct 
democratic rights for the rank-and-file membership, responding to a perceived demand 
among members for more influence on party affairs. The CDU notes in its 1989 report that 
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‘[m]embers do not want simply to carry out decisions by the board; they want to partake in 
political decision-making processes’,
48
while SPD states in its 1995 report that ‘[t]he reason 
for becoming a party member . . . is changing: if it used to be primarily the agreement with 
the basic policy goals, it is now the possibilities for political influence’.
49
As of 1993, the 
SPD permitted the use of both consultative and binding membership ballots in selecting party 
policy and personnel.
50
Furthermore, General Secretary Mu¨ntefering also proposed the 
introduction of primaries in the selection of parliamentary candidates, albeit  
unsuccessfully.
51
The CDU introduced consultative membership balloting in the selection of 
personnel in 1995, and expanded it to include policy matters in 2003. The same year it also 
introduced a binding membership ballot in personnel and policy selection up to the highest 
local level.
52
Traditional recruitment. Conventional recruitment campaigns are a key remedy in both 
parties’ response to membership decline, emphasised in all their reports. The SPD lists 
member recruitment as a key outward activity for local branches in its 1993 report,
53
and 
the 1995 report identifies stabilisation of the membership figures and the recruitment of 
underrepresented demographics as the main goals of the commission.
54
Consequently, the 
commission devotes much space to preparation of a recruitment campaign, which it 
describes as central in making 1996 ‘the year of the organisation’.
55
The 2005 report 
similarly discusses refinement of recruiting techniques prior to a 2006 campaign.
56
In its 1989 report, the CDU characterises its shrinking membership as a key 
problem to address and expresses concern over the lopsided gender and age distribution in 
its ranks as well as underrepresentation of certain professional groups. Recruitment 
efforts are therefore supposed to target these groups particularly,
57 
an instruction repeated 
in the 1995 and 2003 reports.
58
Moreover, the 2003 report introduces new suggestions for 
how to go about recruiting.
Improving membership maintenance. Acknowledging that many party members have only a
tenuous relationship to their party in the post-industrial society, the SPD and the CDU stress 
the importance of proper integration of members.59 In each publication, they place emphasis 
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on offering members substantive participatory opportunities. Accordingly, both parties 
repeatedly emphasise the importance of training members in preparation for candidacy. 
However, the SPD differs from the CDU in its generally more complete membership 
package: while the CDU also notes that the party has a responsibility to greet new 
members and stay in touch with them in its 1989 and 2003 reports, the SPD emphasises the 
social dimension in all its reports: membership must be fun and offer recreational activities 
beyond the political work. It elaborates at length – primarily in the 1995 report – the 
obligation it has in supporting contact with members, lest they feel alienated by the party. 
Relatedly, the CDU points out in all three reports that to involve more women in party 
affairs, the party needs to accommodate its schedule to the demands of family life. 
Organisational  innovation
Opening up the party.  A key ambition in each party is to become the hub in a network of 
political activity, with the party cooperating on an ad hoc basis with non-party actors. 
These outsiders may be individuals or interest groups willing to cooperate with party 
activists in temporally and thematically fixed activities according to their particular interests. 
The 1993, 1995 and 2005 SPD reports welcome non-members to work with party activists 
in forums on specific subjects, for instance environmental protection and North/South 
relations.
60
The CDU offers similar opportunities for party sympathisers in all its 
reports.
61
Furthermore, the CDU began offering a cost-free temporary guest membership in 
1995,
62
while the SPD introduced temporary guest membership in 2005, but for a fee.
63
In both parties, guest members were given speech and propositional rights at party 
meetings, but could not vote.
The most prominent, albeit most abstract, attempts at opening up the party to non- 
partisans, however, are former SPD party manager Matthias Machnig’s Netzwerkpartei
(‘network party’) and the CDU’s Bu¨rgerpartei (‘citizen party’).
64
Essentially alike, both 
concepts take as given that the modern citizenry is heterogeneous and individualised and 
political loyalties are contingent. Accordingly, the two parties must adapt organisationally 
to accommodate a socially and geographically mobile citizenry willing to participate in 
politics predominantly on a short-term and substantially limited basis. Therefore, the party 
organisation functions as a centre of traditional membership party units: branches and 
activists. Yet encircling the party organisational core is a second tier of voluntary and 
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professional individuals and groups representing civil society, the corporate sector, 
academia, foreign sister parties. These secondary supporters and Dialogpartner are assets to 
be invoked for, and who themselves initiate, mutually beneficial cooperation to address 
specific political and societal issues. Central to the concept is the internet as a key means for 
enabling and facilitating cooperation, to make effective use of which the parties must master 
the modern information and communications paradigm.
Why do they respond to membership decline? 
Arguments for organisational consolidation
The SPD and the CDU advance three arguments for seeking to remain membership parties: 
preserving an organisational legacy; complying with the legal-normative imperative; and 
maintaining electoral competitiveness. In addition, the SPD sees the membership model as 
the only organisational option for a social democratic party. The CDU does not make 
such a link between Christian democratic ideology and party organisation.
Preserving the organisational legacy. Both the SPD and the CDU contextualise their reforms 
by underlining an organisational legacy of being membership parties. In all three reports, 
the SPD points out at the beginning that it tout court is a membership party and that 
organisationally there exists no alternative to it. This is stressed several times in the lengthy 
1993 report, most forcefully on page 1 of the preface by party manager Karlheinz Blessing: 
‘The SPD is the oldest and largest membership party in Germany. This will remain the case. 
Therefore I would like to give a rejection to all those who want to turn it into simply an 
association releasing balloons during electoral campaigns’.
65
The 1995 report states several 
times that the SPD is and will remain a membership party.
66
The 2005 report explains that 
the SPD has often reformed organisationally in its 140-year history, but never strayed away 
from the ‘membership party philosophy’.
67
The CDU has a much shorter history than the SPD as a membership party, but high- 
lights its post-war transformation into one. As its member loss did not begin until the mid-
1980s, the 1989 report warns of what may be underway. Under the heading ‘Active and 
informed membership as basis for a people’s party’, the 1989 report notes the years of 
strong membership growth from 1969 to 1982, and characterises the downward trend 
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starting in 1985 as worrying.
68
In the 1995 report, the CDU links past and future: ‘The 
CDU has in the 50 years since its founding developed into a strong membership party . . . 
The CDU must also in the future be a strong membership party’.
69
The 2003 report explicitly 
notes the CDU’s successful post-war transformation from a party of notables into a 
membership party, and the resulting mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of men and 
women for the common good. It then identifies as key the preservation of the CDU’s future 
as a large people’s party in the context of the ever-changing modern society.
70
Thus, the SPD and the CDU emphasise their organisational identity as parties of 
mass membership, albeit differently in one regard. The SPD was always a membership party, 
and perceives it as an intrinsic duty to remain one. Indeed, the repeated use of the verb ‘remain’ 
underlines the historic dimension. To transform the SPD into some sort of ‘empty vessel’ at 
sea only at election time would thus dishonour its legacy.
71
The CDU, on the other hand, 
accentuates its post-war transformation into a membership party and fears regress.
The legal-normative imperative. The parameters of post-war German politics are the legal 
framework placing parties at the epicentre of democracy. Its backdrop is the democratic 
breakdown of the Weimar Republic, which grew in part from widespread popular discontent 
with political parties. The 1949 German Basic Law and the 1967 Party Law sought to 
address the ordeal with the role they assign to parties in structuring the government. The laws 
state explicitly the role of political parties in the ‘formation of the political will of the 
people’.
72
The Party Law then specifies that this necessitates the active participation of 
citizens and fostering linkage between the people and the government. Accordingly, 
Scarrow notes that ‘Germans are particularly sensitive to the suggestion that parties might be 
losing the support of the citizens they are supposed to represent’.
73
While neither the Basic Law nor the Party Law stipulates that the parties must have a 
specific number or ratio of party members, Article 2 of the Party Law indirectly includes a 
large membership as an attribute in its definition of a party. Moreover, Article 21 of the 
Basic Law requires the parties to sustain intra-party democracy. Thirdly, they are legally 
required to acquire at least 50 per cent of their revenues from non-state sources, e.g. 
membership dues.
74
Hence the SPD and the CDU conclude that a large membership 
organisation is necessary for the fulfilment of their constitutional mandate. In the 1993 
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report, the SPD states:
The SPD, in accordance with its basic values, wishes to fulfil the Basic Law’s
commission that the parties contribute to the ‘formation of the political will of the 
people’, realised with the active participation of the great majority of its members 
and leaders through an open and intensive cooperation between party and society.
75
Upon describing how parties generally are key actors in mediating between the government 
and the people, the 1995 report specifies that ‘[t]he democratic membership parties, 
particularly the large people’s parties, play a central role in this political mediation 
process’.
76
The 2005 report likewise states that ‘[a] strong membership party SPD is for us 
an important contribution to strengthening our democracy’.
77
In its first report, the CDU sets out to recruit especially more young people, women and 
workers to diversify demographically those representing it officially, given the preponderance 
of middle-aged men in the party’s membership.
78
This goal is put explicitly in the context of 
the Basic Law’s Article 21: ‘Among the tasks assigned to the parties by the constitution is the 
pool of candidates for the parliaments’. The 1995 report describes members as ‘the vital, 
democratic roots of our party, they make sure that the CDU’s policies remain vivid, in touch 
with the people, and open-minded’.
79
Finally, the 2005 report prescribes how the party can 
ensure democratic linkage through membership:
Only a party that constantly seeks entrenchment in all reachable societal groups lives 
in the real world. Therefore the strengthening of the CDU as a membership party – 
with elected representatives and officials of all social strata, age and occupational 
groups as well as both genders – is a key element on the way to becoming 
Bu¨rgerpartei CDU.
80
Maintaining electoral competitiveness. Both parties acknowledge that members still matter 
for electoral-strategic reasons. In the 1993 report, the SPD acknowledges members’ 
outreach functions and the importance of the fees for the financial state of the party.
81
The 
1995 report encourages members to participate in campaigning, referring to them as 
‘campaign helpers’.
82
The 2005 report stresses the importance of strengthening the SPD as 
a membership organisation in the former DDR states, as electoral competitiveness depends 
upon it.
83
The CDU mentions members as workers, candidates and funders in the 1989 
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report,
84
and the 1995 report describes a broad and diversified membership as ‘the 
foundation of our political success’.
85  The  2003 report underlines in particular members’ 
outreach function.
86
SPD: ideological affinity. Finally, the SPD, unlike the CDU, connects its organisation to 
its ideology. The 1993 report observes that ‘if the SPD wishes to change society  towards  
more  fairness  and  solidarity,  it  must  have  a  local  presence.  Its members and 
functionaries must be trustees and contact persons’.
87
The opening paragraph of the section 
that deals exclusively with recruiting members in the 1995 report reads: ‘[t]he 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands strives for a solidary, fair, democratic, open as 
well as ecologically responsible society. The SPD’s organisation and working methods must 
be oriented towards these political goals’.
88
Most explicit is the 2005 report, which declares: 
‘The discussion, whether to be a membership and people’s party or an electoral 
association/a network party of professionals and representatives, is not new. We declare: for 
social democracy there is no alternative to the principle of a membership and people’s 
party’.
89
  
Arguments for organisational innovation
Adapting to societal change. Reflective of the less comprehensive organisational 
innovation measures, these are both less discussed and more vaguely explained. The SPD 
and the CDU perceive an imperative to adapt as organisations to a changing society, 
including accommodation of the new ways of political participation that have emerged. 
The SPD reasons thus:
The party must preserve itself under changed societal conditions and ensure that it 
conveys its orientations to people as well as takes in their legitimate interests and 
translates them to policies.  The effective turning of the party towards society, the 
opening up of party arrangements to non-members, making use of internal and 
external expertise in the political work . . . are steps towards that.
90
Machnig elaborates what societal change implies: ‘The party now stands . . . before the task of 
reacting politically and organisationally to the developments of the information and 
73 
knowledge society’.
91
The CDU refers to the broad variety of new participation forms in 
their justification of the Bu¨rgerpartei reforms:
As a citizens’ party the CDU must take in and respond to the new societal realities. . . . 
The CDU must accommodate in a positive way the new forms of political-social 
articulation through networks, citizens’ initiatives and informal groups and speak to 
them in all their diversity.
92
Discussion and conclusion
Taken together, the eight reform proposals by the SPD and the CDU yield two main 
findings. Firstly, both the SPD and the CDU mostly seek to consolidate their membership 
organisations. Both emphasise traditional membership recruitment and maintenance, 
combined with expansion of intra-democratic rights. However, both are also open to 
innovation by opening up their parties to non-partisans in order to adapt to societal change. 
The introduction of temporary membership could be seen as a move to consolidate the 
membership organisation. On the other hand, as an implicit acknowledgement of modern 
citizens’ presumed hesitation towards formal, long-term political involvement, it is better 
labelled an innovative measure. In sum, the parties’ preferred response to member loss is 
organisational consolidation, yet combined with some degree of organisational innovation. 
Plausibly, the parties are warming up to more innovation, as there is no sign of the decline 
trend turning.
Furthermore, the SPD is more wedded to the mass membership model than the 
CDU, making the association between its ideology and mass membership. Also, the 
proposition of the network party was never advanced by the party itself, only its one-
time party manager. The 2005 report flat-out dismisses the idea. On the contrary, the 
comprehensive 2003 reform proposal by the CDU centred on the concept of the network 
party. Thus, the CDU is more open to organisational innovation without an ideological 
affinity between mass membership and Christian democracy.
Secondly, the SPD and the CDU emphasise their organisational legacies and a 
legal-normative imperative to account for their commitment to mass membership. 
Together, and at a general level, the two arguments form a path-dependent rationale for 
grassroots membership: preserving a tradition as mass membership parties begun by 
organisational choices made at a distant point in time. The SPD has been one since its 
1875 founding, and the CDU transformed into a mass membership party in the post-war era, 
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and both view mass membership as encouraged by law since 1949 (and reinforced by a 
second law in 1967).
The findings have important implications for the academic debate. Firstly, more 
research on demand for membership is needed, as these particular two parties emphasise 
benefits that go beyond the strictly electoral-functional, which is the focus of the existing 
literature. While the SPD and the CDU also cite electoral competitiveness, preservation of 
a path-dependent tradition of mass membership makes up the bulk of their argument for it. 
This is thus a case for mass membership based on historical choices made by the parties 
rather than necessity: The CDU governed for nearly 20 years upon its founding without a 
mass organisation, and the SPD dismisses the electoral-professional party model not as 
ineffective, but as incompatible with their organisational identity.
Secondly, as ideology influences parties’ view of membership, it can be expected that 
parties of different ideological hue will respond to decline in different ways. For example, 
social democratic parties are likely to favour organisational consolidation to a greater degree 
than parties on the right, if they regard membership loss as a threat to their organisational 
identity.
Thirdly, in polities that constitutionally recognise parties’ place in democracy, 
parties may be more likely to opt for organisational consolidation than parties in polities with 
no such recognition. This presupposes that parties themselves perceive an imperative for 
mass membership in the legal framework. As demonstrated in Ingrid van Biezen’s research 
project on parties’ place in constitutions and public law, Germany was a pioneer in the 
recognition of parties’ positive contribution to democracy in their constitution.
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Further 
research should investigate how constitutional recognition or non-recognition of parties’  
democratic role impacts response to membership decline. If mass membership is 
indispensable to party linkage, the legal framework could be critical to supporting both.
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